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Hon. Diana E. Murphy, Chair
United States Sentencing Commission
Washington, D.C.
Dear Judge Murphy:
I am writing in response to the Commission's request
for comment published in the Federal Register on
January 17, 2003. I will address the question of whether
the base offense level andor the loss table of U.S.S.G.
S 2BI.I should be further modified to provide across-the-
board sentence increases for economic crime offenders
at virtually all loss levels. In my view, no case for doing
so has yet been made.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Department of Justice
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act") was passed in the
summer Of 2002 in response to a spate of corporate
scandals involving mismanagement, questionable
accounting practices, and a variety of allegedly criminal
behavior by senior officers of some of America's largest
corporations. In January 2003, the Commission passed
a set of emergency amendments in response to
directives in the Act. Prior to the passage of the January
2003 amendments, the Department of Justice argued
that Sarbanes-Oxley contained an express or implied
directive that sentences should be increased for virtually
all economic crimes, regardless of loss amount or other
indicia of seriousness. The Commission reviewed the
language and legislative history of the Act and wisely
rejected the view that it mandated across-the-board
sentence increases. Instead, the Commission enacted a
number of amendments targeting sentence increases at
those serious corporate offenders whose misdeeds were
the focus of the language and legislative history of the
Act.
The Department of Justice has nonetheless persisted
in its campaign to secure sentence increases for all
classes of economic crime. Its Commission representa-
tive has proposed modifications to the loss table of
S 2BI.i, and I am given to understand that the Depart-
ment is draffing legislation for congressional consider-
ation that would mandate sentence increases.
Should legislation be enacted, the Commission
would, of course, be obliged to comply with its dictates.
Federal Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 15, No. 4, Pp. 284-90, ISSN 1053-9867, electronic ISSN 1533-8363. © 2003 by the Vera Institute
of Justice. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to Rights and Permissions, University of California Press,
Journals Division, 2000 Center Street, Suite 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL. 15, NO. 4 • APRIL 2003
In the absence of such legislation, however, the
Commission's charge is to make new law only when
there is a sound, compelling case for doing so. Particu-
larly where the proposed course of action is a significant
increase in the length of prison sentences to be served
by literally thousands of defendants, the burden of
proving the advisability of acting is very high.
Thus far, the Justice Department's argument in favor
of raising economic crime sentences across the board
has rested entirely on the contention that the Commis-
sion was required to raise all sentences by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Entirely absent has been any effort to explain
why the Commission should enact a general sentence
increase. To date, the Department has failed to support
its proposals with arguments grounded in experience,
statistical evidence, penological theory, reason, or
common sense.
The Justice Department's approach has the rhetori-
cal advantage of making a response difficult. One
cannot rationally analyze an argument that has not been
made. However, the Department's abstention from
substantive argument leaves even a potentially sympa-
thetic observer like myself- a former federal and state
white collar prosecutor with no affinity for thieves and
swindlers -at something of a loss. Therefore, in
composing the following comments, I have been
compelled to consider the arguments one can only
presume the Department would make if it were to
engage in a debate on the merits.
Response to a Crime Wave?
It occurred to me that the Department might be
proposing sentence increases in response to a rising
tide of economic crime. Therefore, I examined available
statistics on the prevalence of economic offenses over
the past several decades. I first considered the broad
category of property crimes. Figures published by the
Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics show
that the rate of property crime has been dropping
steadily since 1974. As the BJS chart on the next page
(Figure i) illustrates, the victimization rate for property
crimes fell from 551 incidents per i,ooo households in
1974 to 167 per i,ooo households in 2OO, a decline of
69%.' This long-term trend continued throughout the
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199os. The Bureau of Justice statistics reports that the
percentage of households experiencing a property crime
of property theft, motor vehicle theft, or household
burglary declined from about 21% in 1994 to about 14%
in 2000.'
Figure 1
Property Crime Rates, 1973-2001
Adjusted victimization rate per i,ooo households
[ I 978 I983 9 I I I I I I
1973 1978 11983 1988 1993 1998
Of course, these national statistics are primarily for
offenses prosecuted at the local level. Therefore, in order
to determine if the national downward trend in property
crime is mirrored in economic crimes prosecuted in
federal court, I examined Justice Department statistics
on referrals by federal investigative agencies to U.S.
Attorney's Offices. As Figure 2 below illustrates, in
recent years referrals to U.S. Attorney's Offices for
economic offenses have declined steadily, dropping by
5,166 or 15% between 1994 and 2000.
This decline is rendered even more striking when
one considers that between 1994 and 2000, the U.S.
population grew by 2o million people. 3 Thus, while the
absolute number of economic crime referrals to U.S.
Attorney's Offices fell by 15% during 1994-2000, in the
same period the rate of economic crime referrals to
federal agencies per i,ooo population fell by 21%.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 3 below, while
federal economic crime referrals dropped from 1994-
2000, the number of economic crime defendants
sentenced in federal court held roughly steady between
1994 and 2ooi. The number of defendants sentenced
for economic crimes peaked in 1997 at 13,571, but was
virtually identical in 1994 (12,631) and 2001 (12,887).
As one would expect, maintaining a roughly
constant number of economic crime defendants from a
decreasing supply of economic crime referrals has
meant U.S. Attorney's Offices must decline fewer
economic crime cases. Figure 4 illustrates the decreas-
ing declination rates for fraud and other property
offenses between 1994 and 2000.
In sum, the available evidence suggests that, far from
confronting a rising tide of economic crime, the
Department of Justice has been obliged to dip ever
deeper into a shrinking pool of offenders to hold
roughly constant the flow of economic crime defen-
dants through the federal courts. There are doubtless
many explanations for this phenomenon. But whatever
else these statistics may show, they do not make out a
case for a general increase in economic crime penalties.
Figure 2
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The data in Figure 2 is drawn from the 1994-2000 editions
of the BJS Compendium of Federal Criminal Justice Statistics,
Chapt. 1, TbI. 1.1.
Figure 3
Defendents Sentenced Federal Court:
Economic Crime, 1994-2001
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Data in Figure 3 from U.S. Sentencing Commission,
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (1994-2001).
Crime categories in Figs. 3 and 4 are different because BJS
and the Sentencing Commission code data differently.
Nonetheless, the offenses covered by the two graphs are
roughly congruent.
A Reaction to Declining Sentences?
I also wondered whether the Justice Department might
be reacting to some trend in economic crime sentences
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Figure 4
Declination Rates:
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Data in Fig. 4 from seven volumes of BJS, Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics (1994-2000); 1998-2000 data
from Table 2.2; 1994-1997 data from Table 1.2. BJS counts
fraud, embezzlement, forgery and counterfeiting as "fraud,"
and burglary, larceny, auto theft, arson, ITSP, and miscella-
neous as "other."
actually imposed. The average sentence imposed by
federal judges in a number of major crime categories
declined during the i9gos. The average (mean) length
of sentences imposed on drug defendants decreased
from 87.6 months to 71.7 months between 1994 and
2001, while the average length of sentences for violent
offenders declined from ioi.6 months to 89.5 months.4
Ifa similar trend existed in economic crime sentencing,
the Justice Department's current position might be
explainable as an effort to reverse it. However, Sentenc-
ing Commission statistics establish that during the
same period drug and violent crime sentences were
dropping, the average (mean) sentence of white collar
defendants actually increased slightly, from i months
in 1994 to 2o.8 months in 2001. The median sentence
increased still more, from iz months in 1994 to 15
months in 2oo. 5
Moreover, the figures just cited apply only to those
defendants actually sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment. Sentencing Commission figures also show that
the percentage of economic crime defendants who
received terms of imprisonment increased markedly
throughout the 199os. Figure 5 below illustrates the
upward movement in imprisonment rates for auto theft,
larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting,
and tax offenders. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c break out the
numbers for the major categories of fraud, larceny,
embezzlement.
In short, during the 199os, an ever-increasing
percentage of economic offenders were sentenced to
prison and those who received prison sentences
received higher average sentences.
Still more importantly for present purposes, the
upward trend will accelerate over the next few years as
the sentence increases built into the 2oos Economic
Crime Package begin to take effect. With regard to the
2ooi amendments, three points should be noted. First,
the 2ooi amendments are only the latest in a series of
Figure 5
Imprisonment Rates (%)
1992 'i993'994'1995'996' 1997'T998'I999'2000 2001
A--Auto theft - Forgery/Counterfeit
-0- Larceny * Tax
- Fraud - Money laundering
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Figure 5a
Imprisonment Rate: Fraud (%)
Figure 5b
Imprisonment Rate: Larceny (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
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Figure 5c
Imprisonment Rate: Embezzlement (%)
sentence increases for economic crime that have been
enacted at intervals since the advent of the Guidelines
in 1987. Second, these amendments embody very
significant sentence increases for virtually all economic
crime defendants whose offenses are even moderately
serious. And third, because the 2ooi amendments affect
only defendants whose crimes occurred after November
i, 2ooi, relatively few defendants have been sentenced
under the new law and we have no meaningful data on
its effects.
In order to illustrate the first two of these points, I
have assembled an illustrative group of hypothetical
defendants with varying loss amounts and offense
characteristics. Figures 6a and 6b below describe these
defendants and the sentences they would probably have
been subject to in 1987, 1989, i99i, 1998, November
2ooi, and presently.
Figures 6a and 6b illustrate visually several points of
central importance:
First, Guideline sentences for economic crime have
been raised repeatedly since 1987. For some classes of
offenders, the Commission has raised sentences four
times since 1987, and three times within the last five
years.
Second, the increases are very substantial, in both
absolute and percentage terms. The Guideline sentence
of all but one defendant in Figure 6b whose loss level
exceeds $io,ooo has at least doubled since 1987 (and
that defendant [E] would now receive a sentence 6o%
higher than in 1987). For the five most serious offend-
ers, sentences rose between i6o% and 33o%. In
absolute terms, Guideline sentences for the same
conduct rose by as little as four months (Defendant B)
to as much as fourteen additional years (Defendant I).
And in the case of Defendant J, whose circumstances
rirror those of the leading figures in last summer's
corporate scandals, the minimum guideline sentence
has skyrocketed from less than five years in 1987 to
mandatory life imprisonment.
Third, the sentence increases shown in Figure 6b
Figure 6a
Description of Representative Defendants
Def. A Teller in federally insured bank. Steals $2,ooo
from bank.
Def. B Wife of social security recipient. Continues to
cash checks after death of spouse. Loss =
$II,000
Def. C Defendant is a postal worker who steals credit
cards from the mail and uses them to
purchase goods worth $35,000, which he then
sells to support a drug habit.
Def. D Defendant commits online auction fraud from
his home computer. Causes loss of $5o,ooo
to more than 50 victims.
Def.E Doctor submits false billings to Medicare
using complex system of double books. Loss =
$125,000
Def. F Telemarketer runs boiler room with 8
employees. Defrauds more than 25o elderly
victims of $250,000.
Def. G Computer expert constructs scheme for
stealing credit card and other personal
information online. Using this information,
he obtains merchandise and phony car loans
online totaling $450,000 from 25 individual
and institutional victims.
Def H President of small, publicly traded bank
commits bank fraud causing loss of $i.i
million and collapse of the bank. In the
course of the offense, he causes false state-
ments to be made in required SEC filings.
Thirty employees lose their jobs.
Def. I CEO of publicly traded corporation operating
chain of hospitals and nursing homes, in
collusion with 4 other members of his
management team, defrauds Medicaid and
Medicare of $io.i million and causes false
statements to made in required SEC filings.
Def. J CEO of large conglomerate, in collusion with
CFO and other members of management,
engage in accounting fraud and stock
manipulation causing bankruptcy of company
and losses to shareholders and employee
pension fund of $iio million.
result in large measure from amendments adding or
modifying Specific Offense Characteristics, as well as
from the amendments to the loss table in 1989 and
2001. In 1987, the theft and fraud guidelines combined
contained only nine sentence-enhancing Specific
Offense Characteristics. By 2ooi, there were twenty-
three. The January 2003 amendments added at least
three more. Application of any one of these enhance-
ments produces at least a 25% increase in a defendant's
guideline sentence.6 Where more than one enhance-
ment applies, the cumulative effect begins to rival that
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Figure 6b assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History
Category I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants
pleading guilty would be slightly lower. Sentences for
defendants with criminal records would be slightly (in some
cases considerably) higher. Shaded boxes indicate increase
due to guideline change.
Offense Level 6. Assumes no "More than minimal planning"
(MMP)
Offense Level 6. Assumes no MMR
c Offense Level 8. Assumes no MMR
d Offense Level 9. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 10. Assumes no MMR
Offense Level 13. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, 2-level
abuse of trust.
Offense Level 14. Assumes fraud conviction, MMP, 2-level
abuse of trust.
0 Offense Level 18. Assumes fraud conviction, 4-level
undelivered U.S. Mail (§2B1.1 app. note 3(B)).
Offense Level 12. Assumes MMR
, Offense Level 13. Assumes MMR
Offense Level 18. Assumes 4-level > 50 victims, and 2-level
sophisticated means.
Offense Level 16. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, 2-level abuse of trust.
n Offense Level 20. Assumes 2-level sophisticated means, 2-
level abuse of trust.
0 Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim.
P Offense Level 22. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level vulnerable victim.
Offense Level 24. Assumes MMPR 4-level aggravating role, 2-
level vulnerable victim, 2-level mass marketing.
Offense Level 28. Assumes 4-level > 50 victims, 4-level
aggravating role, 2-level vulnerable victim.
Offense Level 30. Assumes 6-level > 250 victims, 4-level
aggravating role, 2-level vulnerable victim.
t Offense Level 17. Assumes MMP, 2-level use of special skill.
. Offense Level 19. Assumes MMP, 2-level use of special skill.
of the loss amount. This is a critical point because the
Justice Department would have us focus purely on the
loss table, as if no other factors affected a defendant's
sentence. Particularly in serious economic crime cases
Offense Level 26. Assumes 2-level sophisticated means, 2-
level access device/means of identification, 2-level > 10
victims, 2-level use of special skill.
Offense Level 18. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust.
Y Offense Level 21. Assumes MMP, two-level abuse of trust,
four-level endanger financial institution.
Offense Level 32. Assumes 2-level >10 victims, 2-level
sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize financial institution,
2-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 36. Assumes 2-level >10 victims, 2-level
sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize financial institution,
4-level officer of publicly traded corporation, 2-level abuse
of trust.
Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 29. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
0 Offense Level 34. Assumes 2-level sophisticated means, 4-
level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 38, Assumes 2-level sophisticated means, 4-
level violation of securities law by officer of publicly traded
corporation, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 25. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two-level abuse of trust.
00 Offense Level 32. Assumes MMP, four-level aggravating role,
two level abuse of trust.
h" Offense Level 34. Assumes MMP, 2-level sophisticated
means, 4-level aggravating role, 2 level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 48. Assumes 4-level > 50 victims, 2-level
sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), 4-level aggravating role,
2-level abuse of trust.
Offense Level 54. Assumes 6-level > 250 victims, 2-level
sophisticated means, 4-level jeopardize soundness of
financial institution (pension fund), 4-level violation of
securities law by officer of publicly traded corporation, 4-
level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust.
of the sorts which receive wide public attention-
telemarketing fraud, complex schemes involving
offshore concealment, fraud against the elderly, identity
theft, bank fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and now high-level
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corporate fraud- the Commission has added a plethora
of sentence enhancements.
Fourth, Figure 6b does not capture an important
component of the 2ooi Economic Crime Package that
will produce additional sentence increases beyond those
immediately obvious from reading the Loss Table or
Specific Offense Characteristics. The revised definition
of loss, which focuses on pecuniary harms reasonably
foreseeable to a defendant at the time of the offense will,
in a good many cases, produce a higher loss figure and
thus a higher sentence than the old definition.7
Fifth, it bears repeating that the impact of the 2001
sentence increases has not yet been felt because these
increases are applicable only to offenses completed on
or after November i, 2OOI.
Too low as compared to the states?
It occurred to me that perhaps the Department's
argument is based on a comparison to sentences under
state law, so I examined national statistics on economic
crime sentences. Figure 7 compares state and federal
economic crime sentences for 1998 using Justice
Department figures for the most recent year for which
BJS has published data. Precise state-federal compari-
sons are difficult given differences in offense defini-
tions, sentencing practices, categorization of offense
characteristics, the availability in states of parole, etc.
Nonetheless, it appears that, on average, sentences
served by federal economic offenders are markedly
more severe than those served by state economic crime
defendants. And the 1998 figures I have cited here do
not account for the federal sentence increases in
November 1998, 2ooi, and 2003. Therefore, the Justice
Department's position cannot be explained as an effort
to achieve parity with state sentences.
Too low as compared to other federal crimes?
Perhaps the Justice Department is of the view that
economic crime sentences are too low in comparison
with sentences for other types of federal crime. A
superficially plausible case for this view might be made
by comparing the 2oo1 average white-collar sentence of
just over 20 months with the average drug sentence
(71.7 mos.) or violent crime sentence (89.5 mos.)5
However, any such comparison of averages would be
inherently flawed. First, no serious observer would
argue that crimes against property are as serious as
violent crimes against persons. Second, it would be
surprising, to say the least, if this Administration were
to contend that garden variety thefts and frauds are as
serious as drug trafficking, an activity the Administra-
tion has publicly linked to terrorism and cited as a
threat to national security.
In any event, focusing on the relatively low average
prison sentence for the entire class of white collar
offenders is profoundly misleading because the vast
majority of federal economic crime defendants are low-
Figure 7
Comparison of State and Federal
Economic Crime Sentences (1998)*
Average (Mean) Average (Mean)
Sentence Imposed Actual Sentence Imposed
(Months) (Months)'
State Federal State Federal
Larceny 25 32 _
Fraud 27 22 U
Burglary 39 27
Matthew R. Durose, David J. Levin, and Patrick A. Langan,
BJS Bulletin: Felony Sentences in State Courts, 1998, NCJ
190103, at 3 (Oct. 2001).
Although the average nominal sentences imposed by state
court judges for economic offenses are comparable to, or
sometimes higher than, average imposed federal sentences,
in 1998 state court defendants served only 47% of their
imposed sentences, as compared to 91% for federal
defendants. Id. Therefore, the average actual sentences
served by federal economic crime defendants are higher
than those served by state defendants.
level offenders whose crimes caused only modest losses.
For example, in 1999, 55% of all federal defendants
sentenced for economic crime offenses caused losses
less than $40,000. More than 30% were responsible for
losses less than $Io,ooo. And fully r5% of all federal
economic defendants, or one out of seven, took less
than $2,0oo (See Figure 8). In short, the average
federal economic crime sentence is relatively low, not
because the sentencing structure is unduly lenient, but
because U.S. Attorney's Offices are prosecuting
thousands of small cases in which little or no prison
time would be called for under any rational sentencing
scheme.
If, rather than focusing on the average sentence, one
looks instead at the sentences now required for even
moderately serious white collar offenders - the defen-
dants who were the real concern of Congress in
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley -the comparative picture is
very different. For example, the current sentencing
range of Defendant C in Figure 6b above (the postal
worker who committed a $35,000 credit card fraud) is
27-33 months; the low end of this range is eight
months longer than the average bribery sentence in
2ooi and three months longer than the average
sentence for burglary.-° Defendant E (the doctor who
overbilled Medicare for $125,ooo) has a sentencing
range of 33-41 months; the low end of this range is nine
months longer than the average sentence imposed on
burglars in 2ooi and almost exactly equivalent to the
34.3 month average sentence for manslaughter. The
range for Defendant F (the telemarketer who bilked
elderly victims of $250,000) is 97-121 months, or 8-io
years. This is eight months longer than the average
sentence imposed for violent crimes in 2oo1, and 25
months longer than the average drug sentence.
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Figure 8
Number of Economic Crime
Defendents Sentenced, 1999
Defendant H, the crooked small bank president who
stole $i.i million, now faces 188-235 months, or
roughly 15 -20 years. This sentence is higher than the
2ooi average sentence for kidnapping, robbery, sexual
abuse, assault, arson, drug trafficking, and racketeering.
And a sentence in the midpoint of the 188-235 month
range would equal the average sentence for murder.
Still not high enough?
In sum, federal economic crime penalties have been
repeatedly increased in the last fifteen years. The rate of
imprisonment of economic crime defendants, the
severity of sentences called for by the Guidelines, and
the length of sentences of imprisonment actually
imposed are now at all-time highs. Federal economic
crime sentences are, on average, higher than economic
crime sentences in the states. The misleadingly low
average federal white-collar crime sentence is attribut-
able primarily to the predominance of low-level, low-
loss cases in the federal system. Penalties for moderate-
to-serious white collar offenses are now quite high, on
parity with or in excess of sentences imposed for
narcotics crimes and crimes of violence. Nonetheless,
the Justice Department insists that economic crime
penalties are not high enough.
Now it may be that the Justice Department is right. I,
for one, stand ready to be persuaded. But the Depart-
ment bears the burden of proving its case on the merits.
So far, it has abstained from arguments on the merits,
apparently being of the view that it could harness the
prevailing political winds to achieve victory without
seriously engaging the concerns of those who have
reservations about the government's proposals. Before
the Commission or Congress gives serious consider-
ation to the Department's position, the Department
should be required to answer at least six questions:
* First, why are economic crime penalties at their
current levels insufficient?
* Second, what legitimate sentencing purpose(s)
would be advanced by an across-the-board
increase in economic crime sentences?
* Third, why would higher sentences advance the
identified purpose(s) more than sentences at their
current levels?
* Fourth, what evidence is there in support of the
position that higher sentences would advance the
identified purpose(s)?
• Fifth, in a period of declining budgets and
ballooning budget deficits, how much would DOJ
proposals cost?
* Sixth, are the benefits of raising sentences worth
the cost?
Once answers to these questions are proffered, a
serious and dispassionate debate about the desirability
of the proposed sentence increases will be possible.
Respectfully,
Frank 0. Bowman, III
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